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The Department of Defense (DOD) spends hundreds of billions of dollars 
annually to procure highly complex weapon systems, supplies, and services. Due to 
recent budget constraints, DOD stakeholders are closely examining the strategies and 
methodologies contracting professionals employ to acquire what the DOD needs. 
Contracting professionals may use lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) and 
tradeoff strategies to procure requirements to maximize the overall best value to the 
government.  
The purpose of this research is to determine if a relationship exists between the 
contract source selection strategy employed, either LPTA or tradeoff, and the contract 
pre-award and post-award performance metrics. Data were collected from contract files 
located at Naval Sea Systems Command to determine the potential relationship between 
LPTA and tradeoff performance metrics. The findings of this research suggest that not 
enough data were collected to answer the research questions. However, the data 
contained in this report will be incorporated into a pool of data gathered from previous 
research efforts to provide adequate statistical power to answer the research questions. 
The report concludes with recommendations for further research. 
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Department of Defense (DOD) spending is the largest portion of the federal 
government’s discretionary budget and, according to the Brookings Institution, accounts 
for nearly 3% of the United States’ gross domestic production. DOD requirements extend 
deep into the vast and diverse American economy, and its procurement for goods 
constitutes nearly 5% of the country’s total manufacturing output and up to 20% of U.S. 
research and development expenditures (O’Hanlon, 2015). In 2013, the DOD procured 
more than $300 billion in goods and services, a sum larger than the gross domestic 
product of many other countries (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2014). The 
individuals responsible for procuring these items are DOD contracting professionals. 
Contracting professionals are charged with procuring the right services or items for the 
right price, at the right time, in keeping with the public’s confidence and in accordance 
with public policy goals (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2016). In recent years, 
with a tightening DOD budget, DOD stakeholders are scrutinizing the strategies and 
methods used to procure what the DOD needs. Anticipating an era of lower budgets, the 
DOD released its Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative—the goal of which was to 
encourage defense professionals to do more with less and to focus on ways to become 
more efficient in their procurement efforts (Kendall, 2012). Contracting professionals are 
expected to employ procurement strategies to purchase requirements at best value to 
maximize the overall benefit to the DOD. The FAR provides guidelines to aid contracting 
professionals to attain the best value: lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) and 
tradeoff source selection strategies. Contracting professionals may use LPTA if the 
requirements are well-defined and if contract outcomes are certain. On the other hand, 
contracting professionals may use a tradeoff strategy to leverage the trade space among 
schedule, cost, and performance. Ultimately, the employment of the correct best value 
approach will support the BBP initiative’s goal of maximizing efficiency and reducing 
costs through industry competition and innovation (FAR, 2016). 
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A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to determine whether a relationship exists between 
the contract source selection strategy used, LPTA or tradeoff, and the contract pre-award 
and post-award performance metrics. We address the following metrics: procurement 
administrative lead-time (PALT), contractor performance ratings, and earned value 
management (EVM) data to show how efficiently contractors are performing work within 
budgeted and scheduled constraints. Our intent is to provide contracting professionals 
with relevant and reliable information to assist in selecting source selection strategies.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This research intends to answer the following questions:  
• How does the source selection strategy affect pre-award metrics (e.g., 
PALT, number of solicitation amendments or protests)? 
• How does the source selection strategy affect post-award ratings 
(Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System [CPARS] and 
EVM performance metrics)? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology incorporates a literature review, data collection, data 
analysis, and discussion of our findings. The literature review discusses procurement 
statutes and regulations, the contract management process, source selection strategies, 
and a review of investigative reports, defense industry perspectives, and ongoing debates 
regarding source selection strategies. We will review as many contract files as possible in 
a four-day period. The scope of review will be limited to Navy contracts awarded from 
2009–2015 and managed by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), located at the 
Navy Yard in Washington, DC. We will review only contracts that employ LPTA or 
tradeoff strategies using FAR Part 15. We intend to collect data from contracts exceeding 
$1 million to trigger reporting in the CPARS. For contracts that employ a tradeoff 




The findings of this research can inform contracting professionals of the potential 
economic, performance, and schedule consequences of employing a particular source 
selection strategy. The benefit of conducting this research is to encourage contracting 
professionals to pursue a strategy that favors and maximizes efficiency and productivity 
in military procurement (Kendall, 2012). This research, in conjunction with prior and 
future projects of similar scope and purpose, could serve as a complement to and 
expansion of the DOD’s BBP efforts to maximize best value when procuring goods and 
services. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
The time allotted to review contract files, insufficient sample size, complexity and 
organization of contract files, and access to pertinent data are all key limitations to the 
project’s research. We were allocated four days to review as many contract files as 
possible. Due to time constraints, we collected data from a relatively small sample size of 
25 contracts. We were not afforded additional time, which would have allowed us to 
collect data from a larger sample size. Due to the complexity of some contract files, we 
spent additional time examining several volumes of documents associated with one 
contract to locate essential data. Furthermore, not all contract files contained a contract 
file checklist, which impeded our efforts to review files in a timely manner. Contract files 
that incorporated a checklist helped us to streamline our review and to collect data 
efficiently. Access to data, specifically CPARS and EVM, posed a significant limitation 
to the project. In order to access CPARS data, we were required to sign non-disclosure 
agreements with program offices managing specific contracts. Additionally, EVM data is 
located in a central repository managed by the DOD’s Performance Assessment and Root 
Cause Analysis (PARCA) office. In order to access EVM data through PARCA’s 
database, we were required to submit an application and request permission. The 
significant amount of time between submission of the application and access to the 
database limited our ability to collect EVM data in a timely manner.  
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F. ORGANIZATION 
This report is organized into five chapters. Chapter II is a literature review that 
addresses the contract management process, source selection strategies, investigative 
reports, industry perspectives, and ongoing debates regarding source selection strategies. 
Chapter III explores the organization and responsibilities of DOD acquisition 
organizations, Navy acquisition organizations, and NAVSEA. Chapter IV provides a 
description of the data collected, data analysis, and findings. Chapter V presents 
conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
G. SUMMARY 
Chapter I introduced the research topic and highlighted the purpose of the 
research, research questions, methodology, benefits and limitations of the research, and 
the organization of the report. The next chapter provides a literature review of the 
procurement statutes and regulations relevant to the contracting process, the contract 
management process, source selection strategies, investigative reports, industry 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter discusses the elements of the contract management process and 
examines relevant procurement statutes and regulations, and the ongoing debate 
regarding source selection strategies.  
A. PROCUREMENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS  
The vision of the Federal Acquisition System is to “deliver on a timely basis the 
best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and 
fulfilling public policy objective” (FAR 1.102). To support the federal acquisition 
system’s policy objectives, the FAR addresses or implements nearly every acquisition 
policy or statute that governs how the federal government conducts procurement 
activities.  
For example, the Buy American Act of 1933 requires the federal government to 
procure supplies, construction material, and manufactured goods from American 
suppliers. The intent of the statute is to give preferential treatment in the distribution of 
funds to domestic suppliers. However, a procurement officer may acquire foreign 
products if it is in the public’s interest or if the item is unavailable in sufficient quantity 
and quality in the United States (FAR, 2016). 
The Small Business Act of 1953 created the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), an independent agency designed to assist and advise small business owners. The 
SBA provides an array of services and is the lead advocate for small business 
participation in federal contracting. The Small Business Act requires “contracting officers 
to ensure that a fair portion of government contracts in each industry category are placed 
with small businesses” (FAR 19.502).   
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 mandates that the federal 
government promote and provide for full and open competition prior to entering into a 
contractual agreement. The FAR requires contracting officers to “provide for full and 
open competition through use of the competitive procedure such as sealed bids, 
competitive proposals, combination of competitive procedures, or other competitive 
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procedures ” (FAR 6.102). If contracts are not entered into competitively, they must meet 
one of the seven exemptions outlined in the FAR: 
• Only one adequate source  
• Unusual or compelling urgency  
• Mobilization of the industrial base  
• International agreements or treaties  
• Authorized or required by statute  
• National security 
• Public interest  
The Truthful Cost and Pricing Data Act, formerly the Truth in Negotiations Act 
(TINA), was passed in 1962 and has been most recently amended by the 1987 DOD 
Authorization and Appropriations Act (Calhoon & Sybert, 2012). In the absence of 
competition, the Truthful Cost and Pricing Data Act allows the government to obtain 
certified cost or pricing data from a contractor. Certified cost or pricing data allows the 
government to conduct an independent cost analysis to determine fair and reasonable 
pricing. However, the Truthful Cost and Pricing Data Act does not apply to commercial 
items, prices set by law or regulations, contracts sought when adequate price competition 
exists, or contracts at or below the simplified acquisition threshold of $750,000 (FAR, 
2016).  
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996 sought to reform the federal government’s 
acquisition system and streamline procurement functions. The Clinton administration 
wanted to downsize the federal acquisition workforce and lower procurement obstacles 
by expanding the definition and use of commercial items. Items could be categorized as 
commercial if technology was still evolving or if the item could be sold to the general 
public in time to satisfy the government’s requirement. The FASA and FARA also placed 
considerable emphasis on conducting market research and commercial item procurements 
and looked to gain efficiencies through low-value, high-volume procurement 
transactions. The FASA “signaled a dramatic change in acquisition policy and shifted 
 7 
source selection strategies to be made on a best value basis and not the lowest price” 
(Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
[OSD(AT&L)], 2016, p. iv). The best value continuum allows contracting professionals 
to consider non-price factors, such as past performance, during source selections. FASA 
also expanded opportunities for small disadvantaged businesses and woman-owned 
businesses by mandating that 5% of contracts be awarded to small, disadvantaged 
businesses and 5% to small, woman-owned businesses (Cohen Seglias. n.d.).   
The origins of the FAR can be traced back to the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulation of 1947; however, it was not until 1984 that the FAR was codified in Title 48 
of the Code of Federal Regulations. The FAR was implemented by Congress to 
standardize acquisition policy across the federal government and to eliminate agency 
specific procurement procedures (FindLaw,2016). The FAR directs the acquisition 
process by which the federal government purchases products or services through 
contracting. Contracting is defined by the FAR as a means of “purchasing, renting, 
leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources. Contracting 
includes description (but not determination) of supplies and services required, selection 
and solicitation of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract 
administration” (FAR 2.101). The contract management process is governed by the FAR 
and is discussed in greater detail in the following section. 
B. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
The FAR defines a contract as “a mutually binding legal relationship obligating 
the seller to furnish the supplies or services and the buyer to pay for them” (FAR 2.101). 
The key term in this definition when trying to understand the significance of the contract 
management process is relationship. This relationship begins before the contract is even 
awarded. When developing and executing a contract, the government and its prospective 
business partners encounter risk and uncertainty. The management and avoidance of that 
associated risk and uncertainty is one of the primary purposes for contract management. 
In most cases, risk cannot be completely removed from the process, but with a sound risk 
management plan and communication between government and offeror, the risk can be 
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managed. It is mutually beneficial to both government and offeror to act together in this 
effort. It is also challenging though, as the ultimate objective of the government is the 
responsible use of public funds, while the ultimate objective of the offeror is to maximize 
profits (Wright, 2007). The contract management process serves to balance those 
conflicting objectives while managing the risk associated for both parties. It is a multi-
faceted process demanding technical, risk management, financial, and communication 
skills that Garrett (2007) appropriately describes as “the art and science of managing a 
contractual agreement” (p. 18). Garrett breaks this process up into three phases, which he 
calls pre-award, award, and post-award. The pre-award phase for the government 
includes procurement planning, solicitation planning, and solicitation. In addition, for the 
prospective contractors, it includes pre-sales activity, the decision to bid or not, and bid 
or proposal preparation. The award phase includes source selection for the government 
and contract formation for the contractor. Finally, the post-award phase includes contract 
administration and contract closeout or termination for both the government and the 
contractor. Figure 1 displays this breakdown. Each of the three phases and their 
associated steps are described in detail in the following sections. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Contract Management Process. Source: Garrett (2007). 
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1. Pre-Award Phase 
The pre-award phase is critical to the success of a contract. During this phase, the 
government identifies its requirement and then determines how the acquisition team can 
satisfy that requirement. Critical issues such as cost, schedule, and technical requirements 
are developed by the government and then communicated to industry during this phase. 
The success and precision of that communication is essential to not only the prospective 
contractors’ understanding of the requirement, but also in their decision to develop a 
proposal and in the accuracy and completeness of that proposal (Garrett & Parrott, 2007).  
a. Procurement Planning 
Procurement planning begins the contract management process. Before a contract 
can be awarded, the government must identify a requirement. This requirement finds its 
roots in what Garrett (2007) calls the “make-or-buy” decision. Simply stated, this is the 
decision for the government to fulfill all or part of that requirement utilizing government 
resources, capabilities, and manpower, or to outsource all or part of that requirement to a 
commercial organization. The government must then further develop and refine that 
requirement into a statement of need, technical and schedule requirements, cost goals, 
and capability and performance thresholds (Garrett & Parrott, 2007). Once the 
requirement is fully defined, market research must be conducted to determine industry 
capabilities. Market research is a critical step in managing the risk of the entire contract 
management process. It provides a snapshot of who in the industry may have the 
capability to meet the requirement, if there is already a commercial item available to meet 
the requirement, and information useful for cost estimation (Wright, 2007). FAR Part 10 
directs government contracting professionals to conduct market research and identify 
potential sources in an effort to promote full and open competition. 
In an effort to “identify and resolve concerns regarding the acquisition strategy, 
including proposed contract type, terms and conditions, and acquisition planning 
schedules as well as the feasibility of the requirement, and any other industry concerns or 
questions,” FAR Part 15 encourages government agencies “to promote early exchanges 
of information about future acquisitions” (FAR 15.201). These early exchanges can be 
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accomplished through industry “days”/conferences, pre-solicitation notices, requests for 
information (RFIs), and other means. In determining the type of contract to use, the 
associated costs, schedule, and performance risks must be considered. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between risk and contract type (Garrett, 2007). The complexity of the 
requirement is often a large factor in determining the appropriate type of contract and 
associated share of risk the government should take on. For example, if the government 
requirement is a non-developmental commercial item, the government should award a 
firm fixed price contract and place the majority of the risk on the contractor. On the other 
hand, if the government requirement is to develop a new weapon system with no 
technological precedent, it may be necessary for the government to share or even take on 
the majority of the associated risk through the use of a cost type contract. 
  
 
Figure 2.  Contract Types and Associated Risk. Adapted from Garrett (2007). 
Development of the requirement and analysis of market research ultimately 
determines the direction for the rest of the contract management process. The choice to 
use full and open competition or sole source, to procure a commercial item or require the 
use of military specifications, and to make the contract fixed price or cost type, as well as 
the choice of source selection strategy, all have their origins in the analysis of the 
requirement and market research. Procurement planning lays the foundation for the rest 
of the contract management process.  
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b. Solicitation Planning  
Once the government fully understands its requirements and the industry 
conditions and capabilities, it must prepare the document that communicates those 
requirements to industry. This is done through the use of a procurement document, or 
more specifically a request for proposal (RFP) under FAR Part 15. The RFP includes the 
statement of work (SOW), and the terms and conditions, and directs the offeror on how to 
respond to the RFP. Garrett (2007) highlights,  
Procurement documents should be structured to facilitate accurate and complete 
responses from prospective sellers … and they should be rigorous enough to 
ensure consistent, comparable responses but flexible enough to allow 
consideration of seller suggestions for better ways to satisfy the requirements. (pp. 
89–90)  
The government generally establishes the evaluation criteria on which all offerors’ 
responses will be rated during this step as well (Garrett, 2007). 
c. Solicitation  
FAR Part 2.101 defines a solicitation as “any request to submit offers or 
quotations to the Government.” During this step, the government releases its requirement 
to industry in an effort to receive multiple competitive proposals. It does so through the 
use of an electronic portal called Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps). 
FedBizOpps is a single government-wide point of entry for all federal government 
opportunities over $25,000 (Nash, Schooner, O’Brien-DeBakey, & Edwards, 2007). The 
portal allows all potential offerors from industry to view federal requirements and 
determine if they have the capability and desire to meet them. Garrett (2007) emphasizes 
the importance of the solicitation communicating the requirements of the government 
clearly. A failure to do so often results in “delays, confusion, fewer bids or proposals, and 
lower quality responses” (Garrett, 2007, pp. 24–25). The use of integrated project teams, 
comprised of multiple senior representatives from each functional department, is a 
technique Garrett (2007) recommends in ensuring the government’s requirements are 
clearly and completely articulated. In some cases, the government may simply choose to 
provide a statement of objectives (SOO), rather than define how to meet requirements 
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using an SOW, and request the prospective contractors to propose their recommendation 
to meet those objectives within the constraints provided (Garrett & Parrott, 2007). In this 
step, it is also important for the government to ensure it has not included terms and 
conditions, unrealistic delivery dates, or other constraints that make the solicitation 
undesirable to potential offerors. Minimizing constraints encourages maximum 
competition and reduces the risk of not receiving a proposal or bid and delaying the 
acquisition process (Wright, 2007). Ultimately, the desired outcome of the solicitation is 
to receive several competitive proposals that can then be evaluated based upon the source 
selection strategy developed during procurement planning. The award phase and source 
selection are discussed in detail in the following section. 
2. Award Phase  
During the award phase, acquisition officials must select the offer that presents 
the best value to the government. The source selection process can be as simple as 
choosing the lowest priced offer that meets all technical specifications or as in depth as 
evaluating each proposal based upon multiple evaluation criteria. This process includes 
the negotiation of contract terms and conditions to be included into the awarded contract. 
The award phase is of critical importance to the contract management process as it 
determines the government’s business partner for the remaining duration of the process 
and establishes the ultimate source of the government’s requirement (Garrett, 2007).  
a. Source Selection  
The Source Selection Authority (SSA), with assistance from the Source Selection 
Advisory Council (SSAC) and the Source Selection Board (SSB), is responsible for 
selecting the source that offers the best value to the government. FAR 15.303 states that 
“the contracting officer is designated as the source selection authority, unless the agency 
head appoints another individual for a particular acquisition or group of acquisitions.” 
The SSA appoints senior government personnel to the SSAC and SSB to advise on the 
conduct of the source selection process and oversee the evaluation of proposals submitted 
(Nash et al., 2007). This collective group is often referred to as the source selection team. 
FAR 15.304 states that  
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the award decision is based on evaluation factors and significant sub-
factors that are tailored to the acquisition. Those evaluation factors and 
significant sub-factors must represent the key areas of importance and 
emphasis to be considered in the source selection decision and support 
meaningful comparison and discrimination between and among competing 
proposals.  
It goes on to state that agency acquisition officials review evaluation factors and 
determine their relative significance, but that “price or cost to the Government shall be 
evaluated in every source selection … and the quality of the product or service shall be 
addressed in every source selection through consideration of one or more non-cost 
evaluation factors” (FAR 15.304). Wright (2007) says there are two associated risks 
during the source selection process: proposal risk and performance risk. Proposal risk is 
the risk associated with how the contractor is proposing to meet the requirement. The 
government source selection team must evaluate each contractor’s technical approach to 
determine the associated level of risk with each proposal. Performance risk is the analysis 
of each contractor’s ability to meet the requirements of the contract based upon the 
contractor’s capabilities and evidenced by previous jobs of a similar scope (Wright, 
2007). The criteria evaluated are unique to each procurement, and it is the responsibility 
of agency acquisition officials to ensure the source selection criteria chosen provide a 
shelter for the government from unnecessary or unforeseen risks.  
As mentioned previously, FAR 15.304 requires that price or cost is an evaluation 
factor in all procurements, regardless of the source selection strategy chosen. In 
evaluating cost or price, FAR 15.305 stipulates the following: 
Normally, competition establishes price reasonableness. Therefore, when 
contracting on a firm-fixed-price or fixed-price with economic price 
adjustment basis, comparison of the proposed prices will usually satisfy 
the requirement to perform a price analysis, and a cost analysis need not 
be performed. In limited situations, a cost analysis may be appropriate to 
establish reasonableness of the otherwise successful offeror’s price. When 
contracting on a cost-reimbursement basis, evaluations shall include a cost 
realism analysis to determine what the Government should realistically 
expect to pay for the proposed effort, the offeror’s understanding of the 
work, and the offeror’s ability to perform the contract. 
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As directed by the FAR, each proposal’s price is evaluated based on realism and 
competitiveness. Price realism determines if a proposal is priced too low to realistically 
achieve the requirements of the contract. Cost competitiveness determines if the proposed 
costs are unnecessarily high. Cost competitiveness is evaluated simply by looking at each 
proposed price against other competitive proposals, comparable commercial options, and 
other pricing information (Garrett, 2007). 
Price analysis, as FAR Part 15 suggests, is fairly straightforward, especially when 
multiple competitive offers are received. Price analysis can also be conducted using 
historical prices from previous procurements, parametric data, published prices, 
independent government cost estimates, and market research (FAR, 2016).  
Cost realism analysis is much more in depth than price analysis and is performed 
with the goal of determining the probable cost for each offeror based upon each offerors’ 
proposed cost in a cost type contract. FAR 15.404 further describes cost realism analysis 
as  
the process of independently reviewing and evaluating specific elements 
of each offeror’s proposed cost estimate to determine whether the 
estimated proposed cost elements are realistic for the work to be 
performed; reflect a clear understanding of the requirements; and are 
consistent with the unique methods of performance and materials 
described in the offeror’s technical proposal. 
FAR 15.404 goes on to state that cost realism analysis can be used in certain 
circumstances to evaluate fixed price contracts as well. Nash, Cibinic, and O’Brien 
(1999) clarify, though, that 
although the FAR refers to this process as cost realism analysis, greater 
clarity is achieved by calling it “price realism analysis.” This signifies that 
such analysis cannot be used to adjust the offered prices but may only be 
used to make a responsibility determination, a performance risk 
assessment, or an analysis of whether the offeror understands the work. (p. 
589) 
The ultimate goal of these proposal analysis techniques is to ensure the government 
receives a fair and reasonable price. The source selection process demands extreme 
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caution and due diligence as the success or failure of the acquisition, once awarded, is 
largely dependent upon the contractor selected (Garrett, 2007). 
b. Negotiation  
FAR Part 15 states that “any contract awarded using other than sealed bidding 
procedures is a negotiated contract.” Contracting by negotiation offers some flexibility to 
the award phase, allowing contractors to revise their proposals prior to award and assist 
in the formulation of the terms and conditions to be placed in the contract (Nash et al., 
2007). Garrett (2007) explains that  
the ideal is to develop a set of shared expectations and understandings. .… 
The buyer and seller must develop and agree to contract terms and 
conditions that are designed to express their mutual expectations about 
performance and that reflect the uncertainties and risks of performance. (p. 
26) 
A failure to communicate during this step can bring extreme tension to the business 
relationship during execution of the contract and result in cost and schedule growth 
(Garrett, 2007).  
3. Post-Award Phase 
After the contract is awarded, the contract management process focuses on 
monitoring and evaluating the contractor’s performance to ensure it is within the agreed 
upon technical, cost, and schedule constraints, and on executing a successful closeout or 
termination of the contract. Wright (2007) explains that “the degree of monitoring and 
surveillance of risk areas will vary depending upon the credentials, past performance, and 
experience of the selected proponent” (p. 11). For both the government and the 
contractor, the post-award phase represents the “fulfillment of the contractual obligations 
by all parties to the contract” (Garrett, 2007, p. 162 ).  
a. Contract Administration  
The primary purpose of contract administration is ensuring that both the 
government and the contractor are in “compliance with the terms and conditions of the 
contract” (Garrett, 2007, p. 182). Nash et al. (2007) list some of the tasks involved in this 
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process: “monitoring contractor progress, reviewing invoices, processing payments, and 
inspecting deliverables” (p. 129). Another key aspect of the contract administration 
process is managing the unexpected (Nash et al., 2007). The complex nature of certain 
contracts can result in a misunderstanding of the requirements, contractual disputes, or in 
some cases, the government’s needs evolving. When this happens, change requests or 
modifications to the contract are both common and necessary. Changes to the contract 
can and often do cause increases in price and schedule. Garrett (2007) recommends that 
when making changes to the contract, both parties be involved in estimating the impacts 
of the changes on cost and schedule. It saves time and helps ensure both parties 
understand what is being changed and the impact of that change. In some cases, the 
contractor is permitted to proceed with the changes prior to negotiation, but must adhere 
to a cost and schedule ceiling set by the government. With change comes risk that must 
be managed. Garrett (2007) states, 
Managing change means ensuring that changes are authorized, their effect 
is estimated and provided for, they are promptly identified, the other party 
is properly notified, compliance and impact are reported, compensation is 
provided, and the entire transaction is properly documented. (p. 178) 
b. Contract Termination or Closeout 
Contract closeout involves closing out the contract, whether it is due to the 
successful completion of the contract or the termination for other reasons. Garrett (2007) 
asserts that “a contract can end in one of three ways: successful performance, mutual 
agreement, or breach of contract” (p. 185). When both parties meet the requirements set 
forth in the contract, a contract is closed out. Closing out a contract requires the 
government to certify that the contractor has completed the requirements set forth in the 
contract and the contractor to certify that it has been compensated as agreed upon in the 
contract.  
There are two types of terminations as defined by FAR Part 49, termination for 
the convenience of the government or default of the contractor. Garrett (2007) provides a 
third option for termination: mutual agreement. Termination by mutual agreement occurs 
when both parties agree that they no longer want to be bound by the terms set forth in the 
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contract (Garrett, 2007). FAR 2.101 defines termination for cause or default as “the 
exercise of the Government’s right to completely or partially terminate a contract because 
of the contractor’s actual or anticipated failure to perform its contractual obligations.” 
FAR 2.101 defines termination for convenience as “the exercise of the Government’s 
right to completely or partially terminate performance of work under a contract when it is 
in the Government’s interest.” Garrett (2007) highlights that this unilateral right of the 
government to terminate for convenience has been the “subject of many U.S. court and 
legal decisions” (p. 191). 
This section on the post-award phase focused on how the government monitors 
and evaluates contractor performance throughout the execution of the contract and 
discussed how the contract is closed out or terminated. The close-out or termination of 
the contract completes the contract management process. The next section includes a 
detailed discussion of the source selection strategy, which is developed during the 
procurement planning stage. 
C. SOURCE SELECTION STRATEGY 
The DOD source selection procedure provides the framework for developing the 
source selection strategy and is required for all competitive contracts by negotiation 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
[OUSD(AT&L)], 2011). The best strategy can be derived from the evaluation of where 
the acquisition falls within the best value continuum. FAR 15.101 states,  
An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any 
one or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of 
acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may vary. For 
example, in acquisitions where the requirement is clearly definable and the 
risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may 
play a dominant role in source selection. The less definitive the 
requirement, the more development work required, or the greater the 
performance risk, the more technical or past performance considerations 
may play a dominant role in source selection. 
The government has two strategies it can choose between when developing the source 
selection strategy for a competitive, negotiated contract. As FAR 15.101 describes, some 
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acquisitions have requirements that are “clearly definable,” and the risk of the contractor 
failing to perform is minimal. In this case, the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) 
source selection strategy may be appropriate. On the other hand, if the requirement is 
“less definitive, more development work is required, or there is greater performance risk” 
(FAR 15.101), the tradeoff strategy may be more appropriate. FAR 15.101 further 
explains that the “tradeoff process is appropriate when it may be in the best interest of the 
Government to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than the 
highest technically rated offeror (HTRO).” The best value continuum can be thought of 
as the range between cost or price evaluation factors and the relative importance of non-
cost or price factors. Figure 3 provides a visualization of the best value continuum. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Best Value Continuum. Adapted from Naval Air Warfare Center 
(NAWC; 2015). 
The ultimate goal of the government is to obtain the best value. FAR 2.101 
defines best value as “the expected outcome of an acquisition that, in the Government’s 
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estimation, provides the greatest overall benefit in response to the requirement.” In 
developing the source selection strategy, the first step is determining the relative 
importance of cost and price to other evaluation factors, and identifying what those 
evaluation factors, other than cost and price, should be. This will determine whether 
LPTA or tradeoff should be used to achieve the desired best value to the government 
(Rumbaugh, 2010). 
1. Lowest Price Technically Acceptable  
FAR 15.101 states that “the lowest price technically acceptable source selection 
process is appropriate when best value is expected to result from selection of the 
technically acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price.” Price and cost are not 
the only evaluation factors considered in an LPTA decision, however. The technical 
acceptability of a proposal may contain other non-cost factors such as past performance 
or management capability, which are evaluated on a pass/fail basis. These non-cost 
factors must meet the government’s level of acceptability for the offer to then be ranked 
according to price. Once an acceptable range of offers is established based upon technical 
acceptance, the government must select the lowest priced offer (Rumbaugh, 2010).  
2. Tradeoff  
FAR 15.101 states, “A tradeoff process is appropriate when it may be in the best 
interest of the Government to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror or 
other than the highest technically rated offeror.” The risk associated with certain 
acquisitions may merit the use of the tradeoff process. If the government requirements are 
difficult to define or there are multiple possible solutions to the government requirement, 
tradeoff may be the best source selection strategy (Rumbaugh, 2010). Non-cost factors 
can be given more weight, less weight, or equal weight to cost and price at the 
government’s discretion. These non-cost factors can include technical criteria, 
management criteria, past performance, and other qualitative or quantitative criteria 
(Garrett, 2007). These weights must all be stated within the solicitation notifying 
potential offerors how offers will be evaluated. FAR 15.101 explains that, in making the 
selection, “the perceived benefits of the higher priced proposal shall merit the additional 
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cost, and the rationale for tradeoffs must be documented.” Just as with LPTA, the 
ultimate goal of the tradeoff strategy is to obtain the best value for the government.  
Given the immense importance of the source selection strategy, which is 
developed during the procurement planning step, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
most significant step in the contract management process is procurement planning. 
Defining the requirement and conducting market research sets the course for the rest of 
the contract management process. Given the significance of the source selection strategy 
to the contract management process, the following sections provide insight from 
investigative reports, industry perspective, and ongoing debates regarding current DOD 
practices and priorities when developing the source selection strategy. 
D. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS  
Due to recent budget constraints, the DOD faces increased scrutiny from 
policymakers over its contract management. Since 1992, the GAO, the investigative arm 
of Congress, maintains DOD contract management in its high-risk category because the 
DOD continues to encounter challenges in providing relevant skills and capabilities to its 
contracting professionals, implementing sound techniques and approaches to awarding 
contracts, and properly managing its acquisition of services and contingency contracting 
(GAO, 2015). The GAO, as well as congressional policymakers, recently lauded the 
DOD’s efforts to tackle its contract management issues (H.R. Rep. 113–102, 2013). The 
DOD’s incremental improvements are reflected in the GAO’s 2015 High-Risk Series 
report to Congress. The improvements are due in part to the BBP initiatives created 
specifically to address contract management issues by promoting better efficiencies, 
controlling costs, cutting burdensome bureaucratic processes, and training its acquisition 
workforce (GAO, 2014). 
Still, Congress is concerned that the DOD’s efforts to achieve the goals of the 
BBP motivates contracting professionals to employ LPTA as the default source selection 
strategy and inappropriately award LPTAs when a tradeoff approach is more suited. 
Therefore, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014, the House of 
Representatives and Senate committees required the DOD to report on its use of the best 
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value processes in hopes of ensuring that DOD contracting officials correctly determine 
the complexity of requirements, properly assign performance risk, and carefully assess 
whether failure to perform has significant implications (H.R. Rep. 113–102, 2013; GAO, 
2014). Additionally, a House of Representatives report  encouraged the DOD to obtain 
the views of the defense industry to determine how source selection strategies affect the 
industry’s business decisions, since part of the design of the best value continuum is to 
foster competition and innovation within the defense industry (H.R. Rep. 113–102, 
2013).  
In 2014, the GAO conducted a congressionally mandated review to determine the 
scope of the DOD’s use of best value strategies. From its review of 2,851 contracts 
awarded in fiscal year (FY) 2013, the GAO (2014) determined that 93% of the DOD’s 
competitively awarded contracts utilized best value processes. Sealed bidding accounted 
for the remaining 6% of contracts awarded. For contracts over $25 million, the DOD used 
tradeoff 58% of the time compared to LPTA 36% of the time (GAO, 2014). For contracts 
over $1 million but less than $25 million, DOD use of LPTA and tradeoff was nearly 
equal. The DOD’s use of LPTA rose by 10% from a previous GAO review of contracts 
awarded in FY2009 (GAO, 2010). The DOD employed tradeoff strategies to acquire 
construction, maintenance, and other support services regardless of obligation, but for 
contracts greater than $25 million, LPTA strategies were mostly used to acquire products. 
However, for contracts more than $1 million but less than $25 million, contracting 
professionals employed LPTA to acquire a combination of products and services (GAO, 
2014).  
DOD contracting professionals’ desire to meet BBP initiatives may drive them to 
employ LPTA more often. The GAO interviewed several officials from different 
commands across all services. These senior officials indicated that declining budgets and 
efforts to simplify requirements motivate commands to utilize LPTA more often than 
tradeoff (GAO, 2014).  
Contracting professionals at NAVSEA interviewed by the GAO say senior 
command officials are placing more scrutiny on tradeoff procedures and instituting a 
“cultural shift” that normalizes LPTA as the preferred source selection strategy. As 
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evidenced by a NAVSEA memo to its contracting operations, a senior level acquisition 
executive must review the details of a potential acquisition if program managers 
determine that a non-cost factor is more important than price. Further, officials 
throughout all DOD services and agencies report that commands are shifting focus to 
utilize LPTA more often (GAO, 2014).  
The previous discussion addressed investigative reports that indicate the DOD’s 
increased frequency of employing LPTA. The next section discusses defense industry 
concerns that the increased use of LPTA reduces product and service innovation, 
constraining companies to cut costs to provide only the most marginally acceptable 
product or service to win a contract. 
E. INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 
Recently, the president of a satellite service provider suggested that the more 
frequent use of LPTA curbs defense industry innovation and capabilities, a sentiment 
shared by many in the defense industry. He continued, “In my opinion, I think the 
warfighter is getting a raw deal” (Magnuson, 2014, p. 1). The trend to use LPTA more 
often is drawing sharp criticism from operators in the defense industry (Magnuson, 
2014). Defense industry experts contend that overusing LPTA will pressure industry to 
reduce innovation and compel it to leave the defense marketplace altogether. 
Furthermore, industry experts argue that the FAR should be updated to narrow the range 
of types of solicitations LPTA could be used for (Goodman, 2015).  
Will Goodman (2015), assistant vice president for policy at the National Defense 
Industrial Association, argues that in a marketplace in which tradeoff is the primary 
source selection strategy, companies will respond by attempting to produce the best 
product at the most competitive price. However, in an LPTA-dominant industry, 
companies are incentivized to reduce their costs as low as possible to a point where they 
provides a service or product that marginally meets the technically acceptable 
requirement. Industry will reduce product innovation and, in an ironic twist, innovate in 
ways that reduce costs and product quality to meet the lowest price target. By employing 
only an LPTA solution, Goodman argues the DOD is telling contractors to “make [a] 
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product as cheaply as you can … as long as it meets minimum requirements. If you 
refuse, we will punish you by awarding the contract to someone else” (Goodman, 2015, 
p. 18). As discussed in the literature review, Goodman’s argument can be countered by 
applying price realism and cost competitiveness. Price realism is used to determine if a 
proposed price is too low to realistically achieve the requirements of the contract, and 
cost competiveness is used to determine if the price is too high compared to the level of 
effort to achieve the requirement (Garrett, 2007). 
Goodman (2015) concludes by arguing that the FAR is incomplete and does not 
adequately address the economic and future capability consequences from employing 
LPTA strategies. Goodman contends that the FAR should explicitly state that LPTA is 
best used for commodities and commoditized services, and acquisition professionals 
should consider the long-term implications of a capability area required by the 
solicitation (Goodman, 2015).  
We next discuss the ongoing debate regarding source selection strategies and how 
decision makers should first assess several multifunctional indicators to determine a 
contract’s complexity and risk and use that determination to attain the best value in a 
source selection. 
F. ONGOING DEBATE 
Previously, we discussed GAO reports revealing the DOD’s current inclination to 
award LPTA contracts more frequently compared to previous years and defense industry 
perspectives that the increased use of LPTA is stifling competition and innovation, and 
driving down industry’s profit. In response to industry’s concerns, two Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) faculty members, Brian Schultz and David Dotson (2015), 
propose a more holistic approach to assist contracting officers in selecting the best source 
selection strategy.  
Schultz and Dotson (2015) argue that Goodman’s (2015) proposed changes to the 
FAR are not feasible since program-level contracting officers should not be expected 
to—nor have the capability to—determine the economic consequences of solicitations 
over an extended period of time. Schultz and Dotson propose a different methodology 
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that enlists program decision makers, with support of the contracting officer, to assess 
multifunctional areas beyond just performance requirements to help program managers 
settle on the best value in a source selection. The multifunctional areas program decision 
makers should evaluate are the contractor’s organizational landscape, the requirement’s 
mission and operational interfaces, industrial capabilities to deliver a requirement, 
contract deliverables, and risk and opportunity management (Schultz & Dotson, 2015).  
First, Schultz and Dotson (2015) maintain that organizations that are adequately 
staffed, experience low management turnover, and align resources to their strategy and 
goals will be more suited to administer and manage complex tradeoff contracts. 
Contracting professionals should determine if organizations possess these qualities, since 
well-managed organizations plan, resource, and execute highly complex acquisition 
programs more adroitly than poorly managed organizations (Schultz & Dotson, 2015). 
Next, program decision makers should determine whether a requirement needs to 
be integrated into the overall operational environment. In other words, a requirement may 
need to exist, operate, and interface with multiple systems within an environment. 
Program decision makers should consider the risks and complexities of an acquisition if a 
rapidly evolving technical requirement must operate in an operational environment 
(Schultz & Dotson, 2015). 
Third, program decision makers should determine industry’s ability to produce a 
requirement. They should study a contractor’s past performance records to include a 
review of that contractor’s supplier performance. Poor first and second tier suppliers can 
lead to schedule delays and quality issues. This information can provide relevant insight 
into the potential risks and complexities of an acquisition. Also, program decision makers 
should conduct in-depth market research to gather pertinent information regarding the 
character of the acquisition and the industry that will produce the acquisition. For 
example, program decision makers may determine that a requirement’s design is highly 
complex, yet ultimately conclude that the acquisition is low risk because companies that 
operate within the industry are adept at making the system (Schultz & Dotson, 2015).  
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Fourth, program decision makers should clarify exactly what they need, how 
much of it they want, and how much they are willing to pay for it. They should spell out 
exactly what a successful contractual performance would entail. Additionally, program 
decision makers should determine the monetized value of performance above the 
minimum threshold requirement, a key process that Frank Kendall writes about to 
determine an appropriate source selection strategy (Schultz & Dotson, 2015).  
Finally, after reviewing the first four functional areas described by Schultz and 
Dotson (2015)—organizational structure, operational interfaces, industry capabilities, and 
contract deliverables—program decision makers should pinpoint and calculate risk areas 
and ways to mitigate these risks. Putting it all together, program decision makers should 
generate an assessment that deems the acquisition as low, moderate, or high complexity 
and risk, based on the multifunctional assessment. Schultz and Dotson (2015) then apply 
the assessment to a color schematic “integrated assessment rating scale” where green is 
portrayed as low complexity and risk, yellow as moderate complexity and risk, and red as 
high complexity and risk (p. 7). Program decision makers should view an acquisition 
assessed in the red category as a candidate for a tradeoff source selection strategy, 
whereas acquisitions that fall towards the green side of the scale may be awarded via the 
LPTA strategy (Schultz & Dotson, 2015). 
G. SUMMARY 
The preceding literature review covered the statutes and regulations applicable to 
the contract management process, the steps of the contract management process, and 
source selection strategies. The literature review also identified GAO reports that show 
the DOD’s inclination to employ LPTA more often in recent years, the defense industry’s 
response to the increased prevalence of LPTA, as well as the ongoing debate regarding 
source selection strategies. The next chapter discusses an overview of DOD acquisition 
organizations, Navy acquisition organizations, and NAVSEA.  
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III. DOD ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION 
This chapter provides an overview of the DOD acquisition organizations, Navy 
acquisition organizations, and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). The research 
provides information on each organization’s responsibilities, structure, mission, and 
function. It also highlights the layers of bureaucracy and oversight within the defense 
acquisition system.  
A. DOD ACQUISITION STRUCTURE 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) is “the principal assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning acquisition, technology, and 
logistics” (OUSD[AT&L], 2016, para. 1). As outlined in 10 U.S.C. § 133 (2011), “the 
primary responsibilities of the USD(AT&L) include: supervising acquisition in the 
Department of Defense; establishing policies for acquisition; logistics; and, maintaining 
and sustaining of all elements within the Department of Defense.” Additionally, the 
USD(AT&L) is responsible for developing policy for the maintenance of the defense 
industrial base and has the authority to direct the service secretaries with regard to 
matters under which the under secretary has responsibility (10 U.S.C. § 133, 2011). The 
USD(AT&L) has oversight responsibility for space and intelligence programs, missile 
defense programs, operational energy programs and plans, military installations and their 
environment, and major weapon systems (OUSD[AT&L], 2016a). The USD(AT&L) also 
serves as the defense acquisition executive (DAE) for the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) on major weapon system acquisition. Figure 4 illustrates the hierarchical 





Figure 4.  OUSD(AT&L) Organizational Structure. Adapted from 
OUSD(AT&L) (2016b). 
Each military component has a service acquisition executive (SAE) who reports 
to the DAE. Within the military departments, the officials delegated as SAEs are as 
follows: the assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition 
(ASN[RD&A]); the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics, and 
technology (ASA[AL&T]); and the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition 
(ASAF[A]). In turn, each SAE is responsible for developing and implementing 
procedures within the respective components in accordance with the DOD 5000 Series 
Directives (DOD, 2012).  
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OSD[AT&L]), the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
(DPAP) develops and implements policy through the Defense Federal Acquisition 
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Regulation Supplement (DFARS); procedures, guidance, and information (PGI) updates; 
and DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Directive 5000.02. The OSD(AT&L)’s mission is 
to “provide innovative acquisition and procurement policy that will effectively deliver 
services and equipment to the warfighter while being good stewards of the taxpayers’ 
dollar” (DPAP, n.d.-c, para. 1).  
There are seven directorates within DPAP that support this mission, as outlined in 
Figure 5. The operations directorate provides oversight to the other six directorates and 
manages budget planning, travel, human resources, legislative concerns, strategic 
planning, and workforce management for the contracting community. The Defense 
Acquisition Regulations System (DARS) directorate develops and maintains the DFARS, 
publishes PGI updates, leads the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) Council, and 
issues and maintains class deviations. The Contract Policy and International Contracting 
(CPIC) directorate is responsible for “developing new, innovative acquisition policies 
and improving existing DOD acquisition policies” (DPAP, n.d.-c, para. 1). The 
contingency contracting directorate is responsible for policy and resources when 
contracting is performed in a contingency environment, and the program acquisition 
directorate is responsible for the development and supervision of procurement strategies 
of major defense acquisition programs. Lastly, a relatively new directorate is services 
acquisition and strategic sourcing. Established in 2013, this directorate is responsible for 
all aspects of service acquisition oversight to include “developing, implementing, 
governing, and executing the acquisition oversight framework of services, and for the 
championing of strategic sourcing policy and initiatives, for the DOD” (DPAP, n.d.-a 




Figure 5.  DPAP Organizational Structure. Adapted from DPAP (n.d.-d).  
B. NAVY ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION  
The assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition 
(ASN[RD&A]) serves as the Navy acquisition executive. The mission of the office is to 
develop, acquire, and deliver state-of-the-art platforms, systems, and weapons that will 
give Sailors and Marine Corps personnel an asymmetrical advantage over the nation’s 
adversaries (ASN[RD&A], n.d.-b). The ASN(RD&A) is accountable and responsible for 
all acquisitions functions, programs, and policy under the Department of the Navy 
umbrella. The Office of the ASN(RD&A) consists of an immediate staff, direct reporting 
program managers (DRPMs), program executive officers (PEOs), and program managers 
(PMs).  
As a result of the 1986 Packard Commission report, NAVSEA, Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR), were the first Navy systems commands (SYSCOMs) to implement a PEO 
structure within each of their organizations. The PEO structure creates clear lines of 
accountability and responsibility, as the PEO is the main stakeholder responsible for cost, 
schedule, and performance in major acquisition programs or portfolios of programs 
(DOD, 2007). DRPMs are also the main stakeholder and are assigned to challenging 
acquisition programs for temporary periods of time to resolve critical acquisition issues. 
There are 15 standalone Navy PEOs and DRPMs:  
• PEO Joint Strike Fighter 
• PEO Ships  
• PEO Submarines  
 31 
• PEO Aircraft Carriers 
• PEO Tactical Air Program  
• PEO Air Anti-Submarine Warfare  
• PEO Assault and Special Mission Programs  
• PEO Strike Weapons and Unmanned Aviation  
• PEO Space Systems  
• PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare  
• PEO Integrated Warfare Systems  
• PEO Enterprise Information Systems  
• PEO Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
(C4I)  
• PEO Marine Land Systems  
• DRPM Strategic Systems Programs (ASN[RD&A], n.d. a) 
Figure 6 illustrates the Navy’s acquisition reporting structure for PMs, PEOs, 
DRPMs, and SYSCOMs. PMs report through their appropriate PEO or SYSCOM and 
through them to the ASN(RDA). SYSCOMs also report to the Chief of Naval Operation 
(CNO) for administrative and inter-service support. DRPMs report directly to the 




Figure 6.  Reporting Chain for Navy Acquisition. 
Adapted from DOD (2007). 
C. NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND  
NAVSEA’s mission is to “build, design, deliver and maintain ships and systems 
on time and on cost for the United States Navy” (NAVSEA, 2013, p. 1). Its vision 
statement is to be “the nation’s team, accountable for the health of the United States 
Navy’s fleet of ships and to set the value-added standard for acquisition, engineering, 
business, and maintenance” (NAVSEA, 2013, p. 2). NAVSEA is the largest SYSCOM in 
the Navy in terms of both workforce and budget. Its yearly budget of approximately $30 
billion represents one-fourth of the Navy’s overall budget (NAVSEA, 2013). Figure 7 




Figure 7.  Navy SYSCOMs in Relation to Other Navy Shore Establishments. 
Adapted from United States Navy (n.d.).  
Figure 8 depicts NAVSEA’s command staff: its headquarter directorates and its 
five affiliated PEOs and field activities. Together, “they design, build, procure, and 
maintain ships, submarines, and combat systems that meet current and future operational 
requirements” (NAVSEA, n.d.-a para. 1).  
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Figure 8.  NAVSEA Corporate Leadership 2016. Source: NAVSEA (2016). 
NAVSEA has five PEOs who are responsible for the development, acquisition, 
and life-cycle management of their assigned programs. For planning and execution of 
life-cycle management and sustainment, PEOs report to the NAVSEA commander. For 
acquisition-related matters, PEOs report to the ASN(RD&A). The five affiliated 
NAVSEA PEOs and a brief description of each follows: 
• PEO Aircraft Carriers manages all aircraft carrier life-cycle support, 
design, construction, and delivery.  
• PEO Integrated Warfare Systems manages all combat systems for surface 
ships and submarines.  
• PEO Littoral Combat Ships manages design, procurement, fleet 
employment, and sustainment for littoral combat ships.  
• PEO Ships manages and is responsible for research, development, 
acquisition, and life-cycle support for all non-nuclear surface ships.  
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• PEO Submarines manages the design, construction, and delivery of all 
submarines, advanced undersea systems, and anti-submarine systems 
(NAVSEA, n.d.-c). 
Each year, NAVSEA’s contracts directorate (SEA 02) and its field contracting 
offices process approximately 60,000 contracting actions for modification, new 
construction of ships and submarines, weapon systems, maintenance, repair, and services. 
SEA 02 is headquartered at the Naval Shipyard in Washington, DC. It is broken down 
into five divisions, which specialize in policy, shipbuilding, fleet support, surface 
systems, and undersea systems, respectively. The Shipbuilding Contracts Division 
supports four field procurement offices: the Supervisor of Shipbuilding in Newport 
News, VA; Bath, ME; Groton, CT; and Gulf Coast Pascagoula, MS. The Fleet Support 
Contracts Division is also headquartered at the Naval Shipyard and supports two naval 
shipyards located in Pearl Harbor, HI, and Kittery, ME. It also supports four regional 
maintenance centers located in San Diego, CA; Bremerton, WA; Norfolk, VA; and 
Mayport, FL. The Surface Systems Contracts Division supports seven warfare centers 
located in Panama City, FL; Indian Head, MD; Crane, IN; Port Hueneme, CA; Corona, 
CA; Philadelphia, PA; and Dahlgren, VA. SEA 02’s Undersea Contracts Division 
supports two undersea warfare centers located in Keyport, WA, and Newport, RI 
(NAVSEA, n.d.-b). Together, they provide a wide variety of acquisition and contract 
support to efficiently maintain a fleet of nearly 380 ships and submarines, their weapon 
systems, and supporting infrastructure.  
D. WHY WAS NAVSEA CHOSEN FOR OUR RESEARCH  
NAVSEA was selected for this research project because it procures complex sea 
systems that are unique to the Navy, but does so through the same contract management 
processes used throughout the DOD and the federal government. Additionally, NAVSEA 
was selected for this research because it is the largest procurement organization in the 
Navy that conducts thousands of contracting source selections each year that will assist in 
answering our research questions.  
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E. SUMMARY 
Chapter III provided an overview of the DOD’s acquisition mission, 
responsibilities, and organization. It also focused on the Navy’s organization of 
acquisition activities and its largest SYSCOM, NAVSEA. Chapter IV provides a 






In this chapter, we provide an overview of prior research teams that conducted 
similar research, and we discuss the research methodology we used to answer our 
research questions. Specifically, we address the variables examined and their associated 
descriptive statistics, the analysis method we used, and the problems associated with our 
data.  Finally, we present the answers to our research questions.  
A. OVERVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH  
Our research is part of an ongoing research initiative that is attempting to 
determine if a relationship exists between source selection strategies and performance 
outcomes. Using the same methodology and data collection guide, but utilizing different 
streams of data, our research attempts to answer the same or very similar research 
questions proposed by the following Naval Postgraduate School research teams:  
• Watson (2015) 
• Lamoureux, Murrow, & Walls (2015) 
• Ban, Barnes, & Comer (2015) 
• Bastola, Findley, & Woodward (2015) 
• Hill, Odom, Osman, & Paul (2016) 
Our data collection guide (Appendix) was an Excel spreadsheet developed by our 
advisors to guide our research efforts using a systematic and standardized approach.  
B. VARIABLES EXAMINED 
For this analysis, PALT and CPARS ratings were used as the two main 
dependent, or outcome, variables (DVs). PALT is a continuous variable that is calculated 
as the date between receipt of requisition and the date of contract award. Contracting 
professionals assign CPARS ratings to a completed contract to measure the performance 
of the contract. Each contract’s CPARS rating was based on the following variables: 
Cost, Quality, Schedule, Business Relationship, and Subcontracting. Each variable 
receives a rating using Likert-style responses: 1 = Unsatisfactory, 2 = Marginal, 3 = 
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Satisfactory, 4 = Very Good, and 5 = Excellent. In this research, we used an overall 
average of CPARS ratings as the second DV (i.e., we combined each variable’s CPARS 
rating to make an average CPARS rating for each contract).  
Our model contained one independent variable (IV). A researcher may use an IV 
to induce a change in an outcome, or DV. In our case, the IV equates to the source 
selection strategy used for the contract: LPTA or tradeoff. An integrated product team, 
specifically the Contracting Officer, will choose the preferred source selection strategy. 
The IV is assigned LPTA or tradeoff (LPTATO) and is a binary variable where 0 = 
LPTA and 1 = tradeoff. 
Lastly, our analysis contained four covariate variables. Covariates are secondary 
variables that can affect the relationship of primary interest. Essentially, covariate 
variables affect the relationship between the IV and the DV and are variables other than 
the IV that possibly affect the outcome variable, or DV. Our initial list of covariates 
included (a) contract dollar value (VALUE), (b) number of evaluation factors 
(NUMEVALFACTORS), (c) number of reviews (NUMREVIEWS), and (d) number of 
offers (NUMOFFERS). All four covariates are continuous variables. We intend to 
remove the effects of the covariates in hopes of seeing the effects a source selection 
strategy (LPTATO) has on the outcome variables (PALT or CPARS ratings).  
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Figure 9 shows the basic descriptive statistics for each variable and indicates 
descriptive statistics for (a) all the data, (b) LPTA source selections, and (c) tradeoff 
source selections.  
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Descriptive Statistics Bold=total for all data, non-italicized=LPTA, italicized=tradeoff Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max PALT (days) 24 447.61 300.86 123 1269 4 277.50 114.17 167 398 
13 524.15 318.70 171 1269 Average CPARS Rating 12 3.54 .73 2.60 5.00 1 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 6 3.37 .78 2.60 4.80 Average Dollar  Value 24 $73,500,000 $106,000,000 $747,736 $386,000,000 5 $15,700,000 $32,000,000 $747,736 $72,900,000 13 $82,100,000 $122,000,000 $982,898 $386,000,000 Number of  Evaluation Factors 17 3.35 1.66 1.00 6.00 4 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 13 4.08 1.12 2.00 6.00 Number of Reviews 16 3.19 2.88 1.00 13.00 2 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
12 3.50 3.21 1.00 13.00 Number of Offers 24 1.71 .99 1.00 4.00 5 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
13 2.31 1.03 1.00 4.00 
Figure 9.  Descriptive Statistics for All Data, LPTA, and Tradeoff 
D. DATA ISSUES 
Upon review of the descriptive statistics, it is clear that we had too few LPTA 
cases. For the LPTA source selection strategy, our data consisted of four PALT and one 
CPARS rating. For the tradeoff source selection strategy, our data consisted of 13 PALT 
and six CPARS ratings. Power calculations (α = .05, β = .80) suggest we would have 
needed 11 PALT cases and 28 CPARS cases for each source selection strategy to achieve 
an acceptable statistical power. We were clearly lacking in both PALT and CPARS cases. 
Furthermore, the data were substantially unbalanced regarding the number of cases for 
each source selection strategy (five LPTA cases and 19 tradeoff cases). An unbalanced 
design will lead to uncertainty about the mean as the intercept and will make designation 
of sums of squares more complicated.  As an alternative solution, however, a weighted 
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mean may be employed as a substitute to the grand mean,1 and the Stata software will 
inevitably control the assignment of the sums of squares. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Our intention was to apply a technique called multivariate analysis of covariance, 
or MANCOVA, to evaluate differences in contract outcomes (PALT and CPARS ratings) 
based on contracting methodology (LPTA or tradeoff). MANCOVA, a group comparison 
method, is a technique that generates a new dependent variable using information from 
our dependent variables (PALT and CPARS ratings). This new dependent variable 
exploits differences between the grouping variable (LPTA or tradeoff source selections). 
However, the data failed to meet many of the assumptions required for MANCOVA 
because of the lack of cases.  Similarly, we could not examine the DVs separately using 
the univariate method of analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) due to the lack of cases.   
With our limited data, we performed a multiple regression using PALT as the DV 
to assess whether or not NUMREVIEWS (the new IV)2 and NUMOFFERS (covariate) 
significantly affected the PALT for tradeoff source selections.  Unfortunately, we had to 
drop VALUE and NUMEVALFACTORS because they did not pass the linearity 
assumption.  However, we must caution the reader that there was not enough statistical 
power to interpret the results with confidence. 
F. ASSUMPTION TESTING 
Prior to conducting the multiple regression, we assessed certain assumptions 
concerning the data. First, we looked for any missing cases and located one case that was 
missing the NUMREVIEWS variable. We chose to delete the case using listwise deletion 
(n = 12). Second, we looked for outliers using plots of the DV against the IV and 
covariate—one outlier on the NUMREVIEWS variable was found and subsequently 
dropped (n = 11). Third, we examined the normality of each of the variables. PALT, 
                                                 
1 The grand mean is the intercept in a balanced design. 
2 NUMREVIEWS is now considered the IV, as it can be manipulated by naval contracting policies.  
Previously, we made the assumption that the policies are not up for revision. NUMOFFERS remains a 
covariate variable that may affect PALT independently of the IV. 
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NUMREVIEWS, and NUMOFFERS all received a logarithmic transformation, which 
significantly improved their positive skewness. Fourth, we assessed linearity between the 
variables. Linearity was not a problem for NUMREVIEWS and NUMOFFERS, but it is 
important to keep in mind that we have a very small number of cases, so there are few 
data points to determine linearity.  Finally, we checked for multicollinearity, which is not 
an issue.  
With all assumptions tested, we perform a multiple regression between PALT as 
the DV, NUMREVIEWS as the IV, and NUMOFFERS as the covariate. We used only 
tradeoff cases, as an insufficient number of LPTA cases existed for this analysis. 
G. RESULTS 
Using PALT as the DV, the results showed that the model is not significant 
(F(2,8) = 2.56, p = .14). Neither NUMREVIEWS (b1 = .42, ns) or NUMOFFERS (b2 = 
.65, ns) significantly affected time-to-contract in tradeoff source selections.  These results 
were not surprising, because even though the tradeoff strategy contained our largest pool 
of data, there was an insufficient number of cases to achieve statistical significance. More 
data are required to adequately test our hypotheses. 
H. SUMMARY 
The chapter identified previous research teams that have contributed to this 
overall research effort and provided an overview of the research methodology used to 
answer our research questions. We identified and provided a basic description of the 
variables used in our data analysis, addressed assumptions and discussed data issues, and, 
finally, delivered our results.  Chapter V provides a summary, our conclusion, and 
recommendations for further research.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this chapter we present a summary of our research, conclusions to our research 
questions, and recommendations to guide future research efforts. 
A. SUMMARY  
Current and future budget realities are compelling contracting professionals to 
become more efficient in their procurement efforts.  Developing an acquisition strategy 
based on sound procurement planning is one of the most important aspects of the contract 
management process.  The source selection strategy—be it LPTA, tradeoff, or a variation 
of the two along the best value continuum—should ensure that “the expected outcome of 
an acquisition … provides the greatest overall benefit in response to the requirement” 
(FAR 2.101). Recent GAO reports signal DOD’s increased frequency of employing 
LPTA, and some in the defense industry are concerned that an increase in LPTA will 
undermine industry innovation and companies will focus on cutting costs. To alleviate 
industry concerns, Schultz and Dotson encourage contracting professionals to use a more 
holistic approach that considers an organization’s landscape, the requirement’s mission 
and operational interfaces, industrial capabilities, contract deliverables, risk, and 
opportunity management when determining an appropriate source selection strategy. The 
purpose of this research was to explore the possible relationships between the contract 
source selection strategy and pre-award and post-award performance metrics. Data were 
collected from contract files at NAVSEA.  NAVSEA was chosen because it is the Navy’s 
largest procurement organization, buying complex sea systems unique to the Navy 
through the same contract management processes used throughout the DOD and federal 
government.  Our data were analyzed to determine if relationships exist between source 
selection strategies and performance outcomes. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS  
The objective of our research was to determine if source selection strategy affects 
pre- and post-award metrics.  Specifically, as stated in Chapter I, our research intended to 
answer the following questions: 
1. How does the source selection strategy affect pre-award metrics (e.g., 
PALT, number of solicitation amendments or protests)? 
Despite the data collected to answer this question, they were insufficient for 
statistical analysis.  The sample size was not numerically sufficient to complete the 
desired analysis.  However, we observed a positive correlation between average dollar 
value and source selection strategy.  Within our small sample, a higher dollar value 
seemed to be associated with the use of the tradeoff source selection strategy.  Similarly, 
a positive correlation between PALT and source selection strategy seems to suggest that 
longer PALTs are associated with the tradeoff strategy.  This is intuitive, as the tradeoff 
strategy is typically used in procurements with requirements that are difficult to define or 
allow for multiple solutions.  In addition, given the multitude of non-cost factors 
evaluated using the tradeoff strategy, the development of offers and the source selection 
process itself are likely to demand more time than the more objective, price-focused 
LPTA strategy.  The higher complexity of the procurements using the tradeoff strategy 
seems to explain the association with a longer PALT.  
2. How does the source selection strategy affect post-award ratings (CPARS 
and EVM performance metrics)? 
Despite the data collected to answer this question, they were insufficient for 
statistical analysis.  Thus, we were not able to answer the questions we sought to answer 
at the beginning of this research.  Our research has, however, increased the data pool and 
refined the methodology for future research teams.  We provide recommendations for 
future research in the next section.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our research project is part of an ongoing research initiative that requires 
additional data. Previous research teams have recommended that future researchers 
gather more EVM and CPARS data to further this research initiative. These generalized 
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recommendations led us to believe that we needed to locate high dollar value contracts 
that would trigger CPARS and EVM reporting requirements and provide us with 
historical documentation in the contract file.  This assumption was incorrect. We 
identified contracts that were required to document contractor performance and utilize 
EVM reporting, but as we reviewed the contract files, we discovered that CPARS and 
EVM reports were not located in the archived contract file. However, after we completed 
our onsite research visit to NAVSEA, we discovered that PARCA established an EVM 
centralized repository (EVM-CR) in 2007 that maintains EVM data on Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) 1A, 1C, 1D, and other high visibility acquisition programs.  Based on 
this new information, we make the following recommendations.   
1. Recommendation #1 
Prior to selecting a contracting organization to conduct onsite research, we 
recommend that future research teams obtain access to the PARCA EVM-CR and 
identify a unit identification code (UIC) that contains an adequate sample size of 
contracts that contain EVM data to support additional research. By doing so, future 
research teams will be able to gather one of the most challenging data points first and 
work through predetermined contract files to locate the remaining necessary data. 
2. Recommendation #2 
Once contracts are identified through the PARCA EVM-CR, we recommend 
contacting the procurement organization that manages the contracts and requesting access 
and approval to conduct onsite research.  If approved, we recommend forwarding the 
contract numbers to the organization's CPARS program analyst.  The CPARS program 
analyst will be able to generate CPARS data reports useful to the research project and 
may identify information missing from the report.  During our research, we found that 
some CPARS reports were not properly documented and that program managers (PMs) 
and contracting officer representatives (CORs) contact information was missing.  Being 
able to identify, prior to an onsite visit, which contracts are missing PM and/or COR 
contact information will enable future research teams to identify PM and COR contact 
information from the archived contract files.  Once PM and COR contact information is 
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obtained, we recommend future research teams contact each PM and/or COR to obtain 
the necessary CPARS data points.  
To assist our advisors in further research, we have provided 50 contract numbers 
from NAVSEA that contain EVM data and recommend that those numbers be turned 
over to future research teams. We also recommend that future research teams do not 
underestimate the size and number of volumes many of the contract files contain and the 
time-intensive nature of locating specific data points for the Excel data guide. We also 
recommend that research teams do not visit organizations that do not employ a sufficient 
mixture of LPTA and Tradeoff source selection strategies. For example, Fleet Logistic 
Center Norfolk typically procures simple, low dollar value commodities that do not 
provide ample data points and do not contribute to the overall research initiative. We 
hope our recommendations prove useful to future research teams and that they will be 
able to use our methodologies to obtain adequate statistical power to test the relationship 
between source selection strategies and performance outcomes.  
 47 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 49 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
10 U.S.C. § 133 (2011). Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics.  Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-
title10/pdf/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap4-sec133.pdf 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition 
(ASN[RD&A]). (n.d.-a). Organizational overall structure. Retrieved from 
http://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Pages/ASNRDAOrgChart.aspx 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition 
(ASN[RD&A]). (n.d.-b). RDA home. Retrieved March 12, 2016, from 
http://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Pages/default.aspx 
Calhoon, B., & Sybert, J. (2012). Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) essentials 
[Presentation slides]. Retrieved from 
http://resources.ncmahq.org/chapters/leatherstocking/Shared%20Documents/TIN
A%20NCMA%20Webinar,%204-30-2013.pdf 
Cohen Seglias. (n.d.). The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. Retrieved from 
http://www.cohenseglias.com/federal-contracting-database/the-federal-
acquisition-streamlining-act 
Department of Defense (DOD). (2007). Defense acquisition structures and capabilities 




Department of Defense (DOD). (2012). Defense manufacturing management guide for 
program managers. Retrieved from https://acc.dau.mil/docs/plt/pqm/mfg-
guidebook-10-16-12.pdf 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). (n.d.-a). About the Services 
Acquisition Directorate. Retrieved April 25, 2016, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/sa/about.html 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). (n.d.-b). Contract policy and 
international contracting. Retrieved April 20, 2016, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/index.html 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). (n.d.-c). Defense procurement and 
acquisition policy. Retrieved March 30, 2016, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/index.html 
 50 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP). (n.d.-d). DPAP organizational 
chart. Retrieved March 22, 2016 from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ops/dpap_organization_chart.html 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2014).  
FindLaw. (2016). Federal government contract overview. Retrieved from 
http://corporate.findlaw.com/law-library/federal-government-contract-
overview.html 
Garrett, G. A. (2007). World class contracting (4th ed.). Riverwoods, IL: Wolters 
Kluwer.  
Garrett, G. A., & Parrott, G. A. (2007). Solicitations, bids, proposals and source 
selection: Building a winning contract. Riverwoods, IL: Wolters Kluwer. 
Goodman, W. (2015, March–April). Lowest price technically acceptable: Overrated, 
overused? Defense AT&L, 16–19. Retrieved from 
http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/2015/03/Goodman.pdf 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2010). Defense contracting: Enhanced 
training could strengthen DOD’s best value tradeoff decisions (GAO-11-8). 
Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d118.pdf 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2014). Defense contracting: Factors DOD 
considers when choosing best value processes are consistent with guidance for 
selected acquisitions (GAO-14-584). Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665124.pdf 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2015). High-risk series: An update (GAO-
15-290). Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf 
H.R. Rep. No. 113–102 (2013). Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
113hrpt102/pdf/CRPT-113hrpt102.pdf 
Kendall, F. (2012). Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the pursuit for greater 
efficiency and productivity in defense spending [Memorandum]. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense.  
Magnuson, S. (2014, January 16). Executive slams ‘lowest price, technically acceptable’ 
acquisition regimes. National Defense. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1383 
 51 
Nash, R. C., Cibinic, J., & O’Brien, K. R. (1999). Competitive negotiation: The source 
selection process (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: The George Washington 
University. 
Nash, R. C., Schooner, S. L., O’Brien-DeBakey, K. R., & Edwards, V. J. (2007). The 
government contracts reference book: A comprehensive guide to the language of 
procurement. Chicago, IL: Wolters Kluwer. 
Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Training System Division. (2015). Competitive 
proposal evaluation. Retrieved April 3, 2016, from 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/nawctsd/Resources/Library/Acqguide/evalcomp.htm 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). (n.d.-a). Home. Retrieved from 
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/ 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). (n.d.-b). NAVSEA activities. Retrieved from 
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/WhoWeAre/NAVSEAActivities.aspx 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). (n.d.-c). Program executive offices. Retrieved 
from http://www.navsea.navy.mil/WhoWeAre/ProgramExecutiveOffices.aspx 




Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). (2016). Headquarters. Retrieved from 
http://www.navsea.navy.mil/WhoWeAre/Headquarters.aspx 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD 
[AT&L]). (n.d.). Commercial item handbook (Ver. 1.0). Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/cihandbooks.pdf 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2016a). Home. Retrieved March 21, 2016, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/index.html 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2016b). Organization Chart. Retrieved March 21, 2016, from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/organization.html 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(OUSD[AT&L]). (2011). Department of Defense source selection procedures 
[Memorandum]. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA007183-10-DPAP.pdf 
 52 
O’Hanlon, M. E. (2015, August 19). Dollars at work: What defense spending means for 
the U.S. economy. Brookings. Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/08/19-defense-
spending-us-economy-ohanlon 
Rumbaugh, M. G. (2010). Understanding government contract source selection. Vienna, 
VA: Management Concepts. 
Schultz, B., & Dotson, D. (2015, November–December). Getting the best value in a 
source selection? Defense AT&L, 21–24. Retrieved from 
http://dau.dodlive.mil/files/2015/10/Schultz_Dotson.pdf 
United States Navy. (n.d.). Navy organization: A look at the organization of the U.S. 
Navy. Retrieved March 27, 2016 from 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/organization/org-shor.asp 
Wright, E. (2007). Risk management in public contracting. Herndon, VA: National 
Institute of Governmental Purchasing. 
  
 53 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
